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COMMENTS
LINMARK ASSOCIATES, INC. v. TOWNSHIP OF
WILLINGBORO, 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977) - "FOR SALE"
SIGNS: THE RIGHT TO YELL "FIRE" IN AN INTEGRATING NEIGHBORHOOD?
In Linmark, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a ban
on "For Sale" and "Sold" lawn signs that was enacted to
curb what residents perceived as panic selling by white
homeowners. The authors analyze the effect of this case on
"For Sale" sign bans that exist in Maryland. The authors
also examine the decision in light of other recent commercial
speech cases which have established a first amendment
interest in the free flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1960's, enormous progress has been made in the
field of civil rights, particularly in the effort to end housing
segregation. With the enactment of a comprehensive federal fair
housing law 1 and the United States Supreme Court's landmark
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970).
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decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer CO.,2 the law opened the way
for the influx of minority citizens into previously all white
neighborhoods. The integration of minorities into many once
segregated areas has not always been a smooth process, however.3
This has been partially the result of the infection of fear among
residents that their formerly all white, presently integrating,
communities were being steadily metamorphosized into disproportionately black enclaves. Searching for the causes of their perceived
problem, many communities arrived at the conclusion that "For
Sale" and "Sold" lawn signs created the impression that "too many"
whites were leaving, and "too many" blacks were entering, their
communities. This impression, in turn, was believed to be the cause
of a panic psychology that further catalyzed white egress from these
communities.
Many communities, including some in Maryland,4 enacted
ordinances prohibiting persons from posting "For Sale" or "Sold"
signs in front of homes. 5 While there are a number of conceivable
reasons for the enactment of these ordinances, 6 local governments
have acted, typically, for two reasons. One reason for sign ban
ordinances is to prevent "blockbusting" or "panic peddling," the
practice of inducing property owners to sell their homes at a price
lower than fair market value because of the actual or rumored entry

2. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (held that an 1886 civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, enacted
under the authority of the thirteenth amendment, barred all discrimination in
housing, private as well as public).
3. See generally United States Commission on Civil Rights, Twenty Years After
Brown: Equal Opportunity in Housing (1975).
4. See text accompanying notes 134-152 infra.
5. For examples of these ordinances, see Comment, The Constitutionality of a
Municipal Ordinance Prohibiting "For Sale," "Sold," or "Open" Signs to Prevent
Blockbusting, 14 ST. LoUIS L.J. 686 (1970).
6. Some reasons include: (1) encouragement of "racial steering," the practice of
showing prospective black home buyers only homes in black areas while steering
them away from white areas. See, e.g., Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 803-04 (3rd Cir. 1976). See generally Note, Racial
Steering: The Real Estate Brokers and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 153 (1975); (2)
concern for the safety and health of jJ{e neighborhood residents. Laska &
Hewitt, Are Laws Against "For Sale'/Signs Constitutional? Substantive Due
Process Revisited, 4 REAL ESTATE L.J. 153, 155 (1975); (3) to maintain the
appearance of the community, i.e. aesthetic concerns. Id. See also Note, Aesthetic
Zoning: A Current Evaluation of the Law, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 430 (1965).
The first purpose is illegal under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604 (Supp. V 1975) (this section also makes the practice of "blockbusting" or
"panic peddling" illegal). And as "For Sale" signs are too few and too small to be
of genuine aesthetic concern or to present a realistic danger to the safety and
health of a community's residents, the latter purposes cannot be legitimately
asserted as rational bases for the ban of "For Sale" signs. See Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Note, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning
and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 179 (1975); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1314
(1958).
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of minorities into the neighborhood. 7 The other typical reason for
sign bans is to prevent or stem "panic selling," which occurs when a
resident, who is otherwise disposed to remain in his neighborhood,
succumbs to anyone or more of a number of pressures to move out,
when it appears that minorities are moving in.B
While there have been numerous attacks on the constitutionality
of bans on "For Sale" signs, 9 nearly all of these ordinances were
held to be constitutional, prior to Linmark. A typical community
which perceived that it ailed from a steadily increasing depletion of
white homeowners and applied a sign ban as its hoped-for cure was
the Township of Willingboro, New Jersey. The citizens of Willingboro soon learned from the United States Supreme Court that the
township's proposed cure, from a constitutional perspective, was
worse than the perceived disease. The Supreme Court in Linmark
held that Willingboro's ordinance was an unconstitutional abridgement of free, albeit commercial, speech.lO
II. THE LINMARK SETTING
At the time of trial of Linmark, approximately fifty thousand
people lived in Willingboro, New Jersey, which had always been a
transient community, partly due to its proximity to Fort Dix,
McGuire Air Force Base, and offices of several national corporations. l l Because of racial discrimination by Willingboro's developer
during the 1950's, the township was initially an almost all white
enclave. 12 By 1970, however, Willingboro had substantially achieved
7. See, e.g., State v. Wagner, 15 Md. App. 413, 419, 291 A.2d 161, 164 (19-72)
(upholding constitutionality of Maryland's antiblockbusting statute, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 56, § 230A). For further treatment of "blockbusting," see generally
Comment, Blockbusting: Judicial and Legislative Response to Real Estate
Dealers' Excesses, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 818 (1973); Note, Blockbusting; A Novel
Statutory Approach to an Increasingly Serious Problem, 7 COLUM. J. L. & Soc.
PROB. 538 (1971); Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEO. L. J. 170 (1970).
8. See, e.g., Barrick Realty Inc. v. City of Gary Indiana, 354 F. Supp. 126, 135 (N.D.
Ind. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974). The district court distinguished
"blockbusting" or "panic peddling" from "panic selling" by pointing out that the
former depends upon direct inducements or face-to-face contact between people
while the latter does not. 354 F. Supp. at 134-35.
9. Such attacks have usually challenged the ordinances on the basis of: 1) the
municipality's statutory constitutional authority to so legislate, 2) the general
acceptability of the methods which the municipality uses, 3) preemption of the
subject matter by other state law, usually the real estate broker licensing statute,
4) freedom of speech and contract, or 5) the restriction on the right to travel.
Laska & Hewitt, supra note 6, at 154 n.2.
10. 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977).
11. Id. at 1615, 1617.
12. Willingboro was developed by Levitt & Sons in the late 1950's as a middleincome, residential community. When Levitt refused to sell its houses to minority
group members, the New Jersey Supreme Court enjoined such discrimination.
Levitt and Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination in State Department of
Education, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 418 (1960). A
Human Relations Corpmission was then formed, and the development of the
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its goal of racial integration; from 1960 to 1973, the township
experienced an expansion in its nonwhite population from a low of
.005 percent to a high of 18.2 percent.13 By the early 1970's, however,
the residents of Willingboro became concerned about the possibility
that the township's population would become disproportionately
black in race and that property values would decline accordingly.14
The Willingboro Township Council held public meetings at which it
was concluded that the major cause of the township's population
change was the proliferation of "For Sale" and "Sold" lawn signs in
front of Willingboro homes.I 5 These lawn signs, the township council
concluded, had created a panic psychology among whites that led to
panic selling. The council determined that the rate of white egress
and black ingress would stabilize if there were no "For Sale" and
"Sold" signs on front lawns in Willingboro. The councilpersons
enacted an ordinance banning the posting of any such signs on
residential property in the township.16 Consequently, an action was
brought by a corporate property owner and a real estate broker
against the township, alleging that the ordinance unconstitutionally
deprived them of their right of free speech under the first and
fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. 17
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
held the ordinance unconstitutional, reasoning that the sign ban
amounted to "censorship" by denying home owners the right freely
to express their desires to sell their property.IS The court added that
"it appears that the true thrust of these sign ban ordinances is to
promote a racial balance, or more properly, a racial imbalance in
order to perpetuate existing racial lines."19 Without these signs, the
court continued, buyers would be forced to turn to realtors who would
"steer" blacks away from white areas.a! The district court concluded
community with full integration was actively encouraged. "Willingboro became a
racially integrated community with each of its ten 'parts' having all racial and
ethnic groups living together, with no section which could be denominated a
white section, a black section or a Spanish-speaking section." Linmark
Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 789 (3rd Cir. 1976).
13. 97 S. Ct. at 1615.
14. Id. at 1615-16.
15.Id.
16. Id. at 1616.
17. The first amendment guarantee of free speech has been held applicable to the
states under the fourteenth amendment "due process" clause. Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Other constitutional questions raised at the
district court and court of appeals levels, 535 F.2d at 789, were not addressed by
the Supreme Court. Linmark Associates, a New Jersey corporation, sold the
property in question, and the case therefore became moot as to its interests. The
Court ruled, however, that there remained a case and controversy as to the
realtor MeIlman. 97 S. Ct. at 1615 n.!.
18. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, No. 74-1120 (D. N.J. Feb.
20, 1975). The district court's unreported opinion is reproduced in a footnote to
the opinion of the court of appeals, 535 F.2d 786, 792-93 n.5.
19. Id.
20.Id.
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that the ultimate effect of the sign ban could be to freeze in past
discrimination by denying blacks a fair opportunity to find suitable
housing. 21
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the district court and upheld the ordinance. 22 The court
based its analysis on the "commercial speech" exception to the first
amendment's free speech guarantee, first recognized in the 1942
Supreme Court case of Valentine v. Chrestensen. 23 Recognizing the
questionable authority of the doctrine as initially pronounced and in
light of recent decisions,24 the court of appeals updated the standard
for determining whether commercial speech should be accorded first
amendment protection.
The standard applied by the court was two-pronged. The court
first determined whether the speech involved - the message
communicated by "For Sale" signs - was primarily commercia1. 25
Finding that it was, because the signs merely proposed a commercial
transaction,26 the court applied a balancing test: The governmental
interest 27 in the regulation of the signs was weighed against any
potential infringement of first amendment rights. 28 The court of
appeals experienced little difficulty in tipping the scales in favor of
the valid governmental interest in preventing panic selling.29 The
court reasoned that the evidence established that Willingboro had
been integrated remarkably free of discriminatory practices, that
there was no evidence of actual or intended racial discrimination in
the sale of homes in Willingboro, and that it was to resist the threat
to the township's integrated status that the council enacted the sign
ban ordinance. 30

21. Id.

22. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786 (3rd Cir.
1976), reu'd, 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977).
23. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See text accompanying notes 42-47 infra.
24. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); text accompanying notes
51-64 infra.
25. 535 F.2d at 794-95.
26.Id.
27. The court stated that the "paramount governmental public interest" here was the
"termination of a panic selling psychology and its impetus to housing
segregation." Id. at 795.
28. Id. at 795-805.
29. Id. at 795, 805.
30. Id. at 798. The court also commented, id. at 801:
To slow an artificial, fear-accelerated pace of racial change is not to seek
a specific population ratio and is not itself a form of racial discrimination. When a fact of human experience, such as panic selling, is
recognized and acted against by those on the firing line in the
community, we the more cloistered should not interpose our conjectures
regarding motive to stifle such action, in the absence of clear evidence of
violation of fundamental constitutional rights.
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The United States Supreme Court reversed. 31 The Court framed
the issue as "whether the first amendment permits a municipality to
prohibit the posting of 'For Sale' or 'Sold' signs when the
municipality acts to stem what it perceives as the flight of white
homeowners from a racially integrated community."32 Jus.tice
Marshall expressed the unanimous view of the eight participating
members of the Court,33 in holding that the Willingboro ordinance
was constitutionally infirm. The Court affirmed that commercial
speech was within the scope of the free speech guarantee of the first
amendment, and found that Willingboro's ordinance violated the
petitioners' right to free speech for two reasons. Willingboro failed to
establish a sufficient relationship between the sign ban and a
diminution of panic selling34 and, more importantly, impaired the
free flow of truthful information of "vital concern" to the township's
residents. 35
A complete analytical understanding of Linmark can best be
gained through an item by item examination of the considerations
faced and dealt with by the Supreme Court in its decision.
Essentially, both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit applied a "balancing test"36 in arriving at their
respective conclusions. Why, then, did their results differ? The
answer lies in the two courts' resolutions of two questions. How
strong is the first amendment interest in commercial speech which
takes the form of lawn signs advertising the availability of homes
for sale? How important is the governmental interest in banning
these signs in order to diminish what the community perceives to be
panic selling?
III.
A.

COMMERCIAL SPEECH

Definition

The standards by which particular speech has been deemed to be
"commercial" have never been delineated by the Supreme Court. The
most that the Court has said about the subject is that commercial
speech is speech "which does no more than propose a commercial
transaction."37 One student commentator recently proposed a
definition of commercial speech that seems to have been implicit in
the Court's approach to the concept:

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977).
Id. at 1615.
Rehnquist, J., did not participate. Id. at 1621.
Id. at 1619-20.
Id. at 1619.
The court of appeals' use of this test can be found at 535 F.2d at 796-805, while
the Supreme Court's analysis is at 97 S. Ct. at 1619-20.
37. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
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[T]he definition of commercial speech ... is (1) speech that
refers to a specific brand name product or service, (2) made
by a speaker with a financial interest in the sale of the
advertised product or service, in the sale of a competing
product or service, or in the distribution of the speech, (3)
that does not advertise an activity itself protected by the
first amendment. 38
The speech in "For Sale" signs fits very neatly into this proposed
definition. A real estate "For Sale" sign refers to a specific home, is
made by either the homeowner or broker, both of whom possess a
financial interest in the sale of the home, and does not advertise an
activity - the buying and selling of homes - itself protected by the
first amendment. 39 A "For Sale" sign is, therefore, a form of
commercial speech.40
B. History

Commercial speech, initially accorded no first amendment
protection, today enjoys a large measure of such protection. 41 This
form of speech was first recognized by the Supreme Court in the 1942
case of Valentine v. Chrestensen,42 in which the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a New York City ordinance forbidding distribution of printed handbills bearing commercial advertising matter.
Chrestensen printed and distributed handbills which solicited the
public to tour his submarine exhibit, on one side, and protested the
city's denial of wharfage for his submarine, on the other side. 43 In a
brief opinion, the Supreme Court held that "purely commercial
advertising" was not accorded first amendment protection and was
subject to state legislative regulation. 44

38. Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New
Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 236 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Commercial Advertising].
39. Compare Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) with Linmark. The buying and
selling of homes has never been held to be protected by the first amendment.
40. 535 F.2d at 794-96.
41. For a fuller treatment of the background of the commercial speech doctrine and
its status today, see generally Redish, The First Amendment in the Market Place:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
429 (1971); Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine:
New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEO. L.J. 775 (1975); Commercial
Advertising, supra note 38.
42. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
43. Id. at 54. The Court stated that the protest against official action had been added
only in an attempt to evade the ordinance, and therefore ignored this aspect of
the handbill, classifying it as "commercial advertising."
44.Id.
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The Court espoused a standard, later labeled the "primary
purpose" test,45 for determining whether speech was considered
commercia1. 46 Under this test, if the speaker's objective was
motivated by monetary profit, the speech would be deemed
commercial and given no first amendment protection. If the
speaker's objective was to disseminate information or views
concerning issues of public interest, the speech was afforded the full
protection of the first amendment. There was, thus, a two·level
theory of the first amendment that classified speech as either fully
protected or wholly unprotected. 47
The commercial speech doctrine lay relatively dormant until
1964, when, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,48 the Supreme Court
rejected the primary purpose test in favor of the "content" test. 49
Under this test, if the content of the communication expressed
information of public interest and concern, it was afforded the full
protection of the first amendment. The Sullivan Court, however,
distinguished Chrestensen's "purely commercial" advertising from
the "editorial" advertising at issue in Sullivan,50 thereby leaving
45. Commercial Advertising, supra note 38, at 208. In cases involving Jehovah's
Witnesses, the Court has held that since the primary purpose of the Witnesses
was to engage in religious activities, their solicitations were clearly more than
"purely commercial speech." E.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943);
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
46. 316 U.S. at 53-54. The reasoning of the Court was later to be severely criticized
by Justice Douglas who had joined the majority in Chrestensen, apparently
unaware of its implications. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 397-404 (1973) (Douglas and Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting) (Chrestensen should be limited to its facts); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Gorve, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(Chrestensen "ill·conceived"); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14
(1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (Chrestensen ruling was "casual, almost offhand,
and does not survive reflection").
47. Commercial Advertising, supra note 38, at 208-09. When first amendment rights
are deemed to exist, the Court accords them a "preferred" position, Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945), and requires a demonstration of a "legitimate,"
"significant," or "compelling" governmental interest to justify infringements.
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973) (mailing of unsolicited
pornography); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (black
student demonstration at high school); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438
(1963) (Virginia statute banning improper solicitation of legal or professional
business held inapplicable to NAACP activities). Wholly unprotected forms of
speech include "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.s. 568
(1942); obscenity, Roth v. United States, 345 U.S. 476 (1957), libel, Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969).
48. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan was a landmark libel case involving a paid
advertisement in a newspaper criticizing police action against members of the
civil rights movement in the South. Sullivan elevated the tort of libel to a
constitutional level. See generally Murnaghan, Ave Defamation, Atque Vale
Libel and Slander, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 202 (1976).
49. 376 U.S. at 266.
50. Id. at 265-66. The Court stated:
The publication here was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense
in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated
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unquestioned Chrestensen's holding that purely commercial speech
was subject to state legislative regulation.
In Pittsburgh Press Co. u. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations,51 the Supreme Court held that an ordinance prohibiting
the classification of job advertisements by sex did not violate the
first amendment. 52 Though the Court stated that the speech involved
was a "classic example of. commercial speech,"53 the Court
apparently considered the sex-conscious ads to be unprotected
because discriminatory hiring was in itself illegal,54 rather than
purely because of the ads' commercial nature. More significantly, the
Court stated in dictum that had such hiring practices not been
illegal, it would have had to balance the first amendment interest in
advertising jobs against the governmental interest in discouraging
sex discrimination. 55 The proverbial foot was in the door.
This dictum in Pittsburgh Press was the first sign of erosion in
the "absolutely" unprotected status of commercial speech pronounced in Chrestensen. This erosion continued in Bigelow u.
Virginia,56 in which the Supreme Court labeled Chrestensen's
holding as "distinctly limited,"57 and held that speech was not
stripped of first amendment protection merely because it appeared in
the form of advertising. 58 The Bigelow Court overturned the
conviction of a Virginia newspaper editor who had published an
advertisement for a New York abortion referral agency, in violation
of a Virginia statute forbidding the publication of information that
might "encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion."59 The Court

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

56.
57.

58.
59.

information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed
abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern. . . . That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement
is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and
books are sold .... Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers
from carrying 'editorial advertisements' of this type, and so might shut
off an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by
persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not
members of the press. Id. at 266 (citations omitted).
413 U.S. 376 (1973).
Id. at 391.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 389. The Court there stated: "Any First Amendment interest which might
be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might
arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is al·
together absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity."
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
Id. at 819.
Id. at 818.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960). The Court had initially vacated and remanded
Bigelow's conviction for further consideration, 413 U.S. 909 (1973), in light of the
landmark abortion cases of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Virginia Supreme Court then reaffirmed the conviction,
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applied a balancing test to determine whether the Virginia statute
was unconstitutional. This test involved "assessing the First
Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public
interest allegedly served by the regulation."60 The stronger the first
amendment interest, the greater the governmental interest had to be
in order to justify constitutionally any regulation of the content of
the speech.
The Bigelow Court found that the abortion advertisement
publicized an activity protected by the constitution,61 and conveyed
information of potential interest and value to the general public. 62
Bigelow, therefore, did not involve purely commercial speech, but
rather, a mixture of commercial and pure 63 speech. As such, the
advertisement was protected by the first amendment. The Court
found it unnecessary to describe the precise extent to which
commercial speech could be regulated, because it was necessary only
to establish that the ad had a sufficient public interest in order to
cloak it with first amendment protection. 64
Finally, in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy u. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.,65 the Supreme Court held that speech which
does no more than propose a commercial transaction deserved some
first amendment protection. 66 The Court overturned a Virginia
statute that made advertising the prices of prescription drugs
"unprofessional conduct" subjecting violators to suspension or
revocation of their licenses and to civil penalties. 67 Adopting the
Bigelow balancing test, the Court first found that the consumers'
interest in making intelligent and well-informed economic decisions
made the free flow of commercial information "indispensable."68 The
Court then decided that the disseminators and recipients of
advertising had first amendment rights, respectively, to disseminate
and receive truthful commercial information.69 Balancing these first
amendment rights against Virginia's paternalistic and unsubstanti-

60.
61.
62.
63.

64.
65.
66.
67.

68.
69.

Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973). The Supreme
Court took the case again and agreed with the state that this was a first
amendment case rather than an abortion case. 421 U.S. 809, 815 n.5 (1975).
421 U.S. at 826.
[d. at 822. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
421 U.S. at 822.
Speech that communicates information or opinion on political or social policies
or other matters of great public interest has been labeled "pure speech" and held
to enjoy the protections of the first amendment. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559 (1965).
421 U.S. at 825.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
[d. at 762.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974). In an interesting due process analysis, the
Maryland Court of Appeals struck down as unconstitutional a similar statute
prohibiting drug price advertising in Maryland Board of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot,
Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973).
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
See id. at 756-57, 762-65.
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ated 70 belief that the impact of drug price advertisements would be
detrimental to the public, the Court determined that the best
approach was to "open the channels of communication rather than
to close them."71
The Virginia Pharmacy Court constructed a new foundation for
first amendment protection of commercial speech. Professor Meiklejohn argued that the first amendment was intended by its framers to
protect "pure" or "political" speech.72 Pure speech should be
protected almost as absolutely, argued Meiklejohn, because it is
speech that effectuates rational self-government. 73 Professor Redish
contended that Meiklejohn's rationale for protecting political speech
should also be made applicable to speech that aids in "rational selffulfillment" in the economic world. 74 It was clear that the Virginia
Pharmacy Court was in accord with Redish's position. The Court's
new foundation, then, was the need for truthful commercial
information in a free enterprise economic system. 75
By the time Linmark was decided by the Supreme Court, certain
guidelines had already been established in analyzing commercial
speech cases. These guidelines concerned permissible forms of
commercial speech regulation the presence of anyone of which
would render a balancing test unnecessary:
(1) time, place, or manner restrictions which
(a) are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech,
(b) serve a significant governmental interest, and
(c) leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. 76
(2) Restrictions on false or misleading advertising. 44
(3) Restrictions on advertisements which propose illegal
transactions. 78
(4) Possible restrictions on the electronic broadcasting
media which, because of their unique characteristics
make regulation more appropriate in the public interest.79
70. See id. at 766-70. The Court found that the State could maintain professional
standards and protect pharmacists from harmful competition without keeping
the public in ignorance of the lawful terms that competing pharmacists were
offering.
71. Id. at 770.
72. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, POUTICAL FREEDOM 26 (1960).
73. See generally Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245, 255.
74. See Redish, The First Amendment in the Market Place: Commercial Speech and
the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 434-47 (1971).
75. See 425 U.S. at 762-65.
76. Id. at 771.
77. Id. at 771-72.
78. Id. at 772-73.
79. See id. at 773. This is implied by the Court's cryptic reference to Capitol
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. 1971), afi'd sub nom. Capitol
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C. Application to Linmark
The "For Sale" and "Sold" signs at issue in Linmark constituted
a form of commercial speech.80 The Court determined that the first
amendment interest at stake in these types of signs was an
important one:
That ["For Sale" sign] information, which pertains to sales
activity in Willingboro, is of vital interest to Willingboro
residents, since it may bear on one of the most important
decisions they have a right to make: where to live and raise
their families. . . . If dissemination of this information can
be restricted, then every locality in the country can suppress
any facts that reflect poorly on the locality, so long as a
plausible claim can be made that disclosure would cause the
recipients of the information to act "irrationally."81
The Linmark Court determined, then, that there .existed a strong
right to receive information from lawn signs relating to the
availability of homes for sale. The right to receive that information
carried with it the right to disseminate the information.
The right to receive and disseminate information about homes
for sale does not, however, automatically entail the right to
disseminate that information at every time and place and in every
manner. A sign ban can be upheld if it can be categorized
successfully as a valid time, place, or manner restriction. 82 An
important hurdle cleared by the Linmark Court was the determination of the proper categorization of the sign ban ordinance whether the ordinance was aimed at the content of the signs' speech,
in which case a Bigelow-type balancing test would have to be

Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) which upheld
the congressional ban on electronic communication of cigarette advertisements.
This reference is disturbing, as the district court there expressly relied on
Chrestensen to support its opinion. Note Judge Wright's interesting dissent, 333
F. Supp. 582, 587-94 (D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting).
80. See text accompanying noted 37-40 supra.
81. 97 S. Ct. at 1620.
82. The Supreme Court has held that the first amendment permits reasonable
regulations of the time, place and manner of protected speech when those
regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests. See, e.g.,
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (ban on willful making of any
noise which disturbs the good order of school session on grounds adjacent to a
school); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (ban on demonstrations in or near
a courthouse with the intent to obstruct justice); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) (limitation on use of sound trucks). Such restrictions, however, must be
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech and leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976).
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applied,83 or merely at the form of the speech, in which case it could
be held valid. 84 The Court found that the ordinance was not a time,
place, or manner restriction at all.
The sign ban ordinance did not leave open ample alternative
channels for the communication of home sale availability to
prospective home buyers. The Court pointed out that the options to
which sellers were realistically relegated, such as newspaper
advertising and real estate broker listing, involved more expense
and less autonomy than "For Sale" signs, were less likely to reach
persons not deliberately seeking sales information, and were less
effective methods of communicating the message than were "For
Sale" signs posted in front of available houses. 85 The ordinance did
not serve a significant township interest in regulating signs as such.
Not all lawn signs were prohibited, but only those which contained
the message that a particular house was for sale or was already
sold. 86 Presumably, political campaign signs, garage sale signs, and
the like were permissible. The prohibited signs were not unavoidably
intrusive,87 were not inappropriate for the eyes of any class of
citizen,88 and did not produce a detrimental "secondary effect" on
Willingboro. 89 Finally, the sign ban could not be justified without
reference to the content of the prohibited signs. The signs were
prohibited, the Court explained, because of their alleged "primary
effect" - that whites would flee Willingboro because of the
implications of the signs' message. oo
Application of the other pre-balancing test guidelines did not
result in upholding the Willingboro sign ban ordinance. The types of
signs involved in Linmark did not propose illegal transactions 91 and
did not contain false or misleading matter.92 They were signs that
merely announced the fact that particular homes were for sale or
had been sold, messages both legal and unambiguous in import. The
stage was set for the Linmark Court to apply a balancing test.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

89.

90.
91.
92.

See 97 S. Ct. at 1617, 1619.
See id. at 1618-19.
[d. at 1618.
[d. at 1619.
ct. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (adult drive-in
movie theater screen visible from public streets).
Cf. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 585-86 (D.C. 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S.
1000 (1972) (relationship of cigarette commercial broadcasts on electronic media
and their potential influence on young people).
Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976) (claim that
concentration of adult movie theaters would cause area to deteriorate and
become a focus of crime).
97 S. Ct. at 1619.
C{. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973) (illegal sex discriminatory ads).
See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976).
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STRIKING THE BALANCE

In Linmark, the Court did not question the truth of Willingboro's
contention that the maintenance of a racially integrated community
was the object of the township's attempt to diminish alleged panic
selling by banning ."For Sale" lawn signs. In fact, the Court
recognized the importance of maintaining a racially integrated
community.93 The strength of Willingboro's interest could not,
however, rest only in the ultimate, long range goal of the sign ban.
The importance of that governmental interest also had to lie in the
substantiality of the relationship between the more immediate
purpose of the sign ban - diminution of panic selling - and the
sign ban itself.94 The Court attempted to determine whether the sign
ban diminished panic selling. Basic to that determination was the
Court's inquiry into whether there was panic selling in Willingboro
in the first place.
The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence indicated only
that there was special concern among the citizens of Willingboro
that "For Sale" signs would cause panic selling, not that there was,
in fact, panic selling. 95 Although the number of signs posted in
Willingboro substantially decreased after the ordinance went into
effect, there was no evidence of a decrease in transiency. 96 In fact,
the evidence indicated that the sign ban had little or no effect upon
the number of home sale transactions in Willingboro. 97 Moreover,
the Willingboro Township Council enacted the sign ban ordinance
with knowledge that Willingboro homes were not only not declining
in value, but in fact increasing in value at a rate greater than that in
comparable communities. 98 The Court stated, in sum, that there was
scant proof that the sign ban reduced public awareness of, or
decreased public concern about, realty sales. 99 The sign ban, the
Court continued, had only unfortunate effects. Thirty-five percent of
93. 97 S. Ct. at 1619 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S.
205 (1972».
94. See id. at 1619.
95. See id. at 1619-20.
96. [d. at 1617.
97. Willingboro's real estate agent witnesses at trial both stated that their business
had increased by 25% since the ordinance was enacted. [d.
98. [d. at 1616.
99. [d. at 1619-20. The Court stated: "[T]he evidence does not support the council's
apparent fears that Willingboro was experiencing a substantial incidence of
panic selling by white homeowners. A fortiori, the evidence does not establish
that 'For Sale' signs in front of 2% of Willingboro homes were a major cause of
panic selling." [d. at 1620. The Court also cited a law journal article which
suggested that a prohibition on signs may, in fact, incite panic selling. Though
not discussed by the Court, the same article argued that no legislation
prohibiting "For Sale" signs could be rationally justified on due process grounds
by panic selling. Laska & Hewitt, Are Laws Against "For Sale" Signs
Constitutional? Substantive Due Process Revisited, 4 REAL ESTATE L.J. 153
(1975).
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all prospective home purchasers learned of available for-sale homes
through lawn signs. lOo This group of potential buyers was cut off
from that convenient source of information, and was left with no
alternative but to turn to real estate brokers in order to find
available homes, a more expensive and less autonomous route. lOl
Willingboro proved an insubstantial relationship between the
sign ban and doubtfully existent panic selling. The township
possessed a weak governmental interest in banning the signs, at
best. The petitioners, on the other hand, had a strong first
amendment interest in the use of "For Sale" signs on their
property.102 It was an easy matter for the Court to conclude that the
Bigelow balance between first amendment and government interests
weighed heavily in favor of the former in Linmark.
V. THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the Willingboro sign ban ordinance. The court of
appeals decided Linmark, however, without the benefit of the
Supreme Court's holding in Virginia Pharmacy.lo3 The principle that
persons have the right to receive and disseminate truthful commercial information was not a part of constitutional law at the time of
the court of appeals' decision, therefore. Even with the backdrop of
Bigelow, the theme of Chrestensen was still prevalent in the court of
appeals' opinion.I04
In determining whether the sign ban constituted a time, place, or
manner restriction, the court of appeals, contrary to the Supreme
Court, was satisfied that ample alternative means of expression
existed. The third circuit stated that "[n]ewspaper ads, in-town
window displays or other possible means of conveying the desire to
sell remain[ed] fully available to all."I05 The Supreme Court rejected
these alternatives, and also rejected as unrealistic the use of leaflets,
sound trucks, and demonstrations. 106
The court of appeals and the Supreme Court differed in their
respective analyses of Willingboro's governmental interest in the
sign ban. The Supreme Court demanded that the detrimental effect
of permitting the posting of "For Sale" signs be well substantiated.10 7 The court of appeals, however, was satisfied that an adverse
100. 97 S. Ct. at 1616.
101. [d. at 1618.
102. [d. at 1620-21. The court of appeals decided Linmark on April 28, 1976, just
twenty·six days before the Supreme Court decided Virginia Pharmacy on May
24, 1976. .
104. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 795-96
(3rd Cir. 1976).
105. [d. at 797.
106. 97 S. Ct. at 1618.
107. [d. at 1619-20.
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effect was apt to occur if the posting of signs was allowed to
continue,lOs taking the approach that "an ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure."109 The court of appeals did not have at its
disposal the Supreme Court's analysis of the state interest in
Virginia Pharmacy.110
VI.

BARRICK REALTY: IS ACTUAL PANIC SELLING
ENOUGH?

It is still not clear whether a jurisdiction could advance a
justification of sufficient strength to support constitutionally a
prohibition on "For Sale" signs on residential property. Prior to
Linmark, the leading case in the sign ban field was Barrick Realty,
Inc. u. City of Gary.l11 In Barrick, a federal district court upheld the
constitutionality of a Gary, Indiana, ordinance prohibiting "For
Sale" signs, which was enacted in order to reduce "panic selling" by
whites. 11 2 The district court noted that the ordinance was enacted for
the ultimate purpose of promoting, rather than impeding, integration, and that the sign ban had a reasonable tendency toward
achieving that objective. ll3 In dealing with the free speech issue, the
district court cited Chrestensen as authority for its statement that
"reasonable regulations upon communication of a purely commercial
nature are not subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment."1l4
The court emphasized that the potential public benefit from the sign
ban outweighed any harm to those wishing to post "For Sale"
signs.l1 5 Any additional expense or delay which might result from
having to use alternative means of advertising were considered to be
"minimal." 1 16
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See 535 F.2d at 799-800.
Id. at 800.
See 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
354 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974).
354 F. Supp. at 134. In the period between 1960 and 1970, the white population of
Gary decreased by 24.9% while the nonwhite population increased by 34.9%. Id.
The court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit added that the presence of numerous
"For Sale" signs in some white neighborhoods was causing whites to move out
"en masse." 491 F.2d at 163-64.
113. 354 F. Supp. at 136. The court pointed out that fair housing laws attack the
problem of segregation on two fronts: 1) they outlaw discrimination in the sale
and rental of housing, thereby softening the barriers to the entry of blacks into
white areas; 2) they attack the causes of panic among whites, thereby slowing
their flight from changing neighborhoods. Id. at 135. The court reasoned that
integration could not occur without proceeding on both fronts. It felt that the
proliferation of "For Sale" signs in an integrating neighborhood aggravated the
fears of white residents who were afraid of "being left behind," and consequently
provoked panic selling. It added that "[tJhe challenged ordinance therefore
removes a significant source of panic and selling pressure from those who
wished to remain in a transitional neighborhood." Id.
114. Id. at 132. Using Chrestensen as authority that commercial speech is subject to
"reasonable regulation" is an understatement of the case's former scope.
115. Id. at 136.
116.Id.
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed.!17 Adopting much of the district court's opinion, the court
of appeals added that "the right to open housing means more than
the right to move from an old ghetto to a new ghetto,"118 and that
Gary's policy would encourage stable, integrated neighborhoods. ll9
The only significant factual distinction between Linmark and
Barrick is that the court of appeals in Barrick believed substantial
panic selling to be extant,l20 while the Supreme Court121 and the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals 122 in Linmark determined that panic
selling was only incipient. Whether that distinction would make a
difference to the Supreme Court should a Barrick-like case present
itself is somewhat doubtful. The first amendment interest in
disseminating and receiving information from "For Sale" signs is
strong.1 23 It is doubtful that any more ample alternatives to "For
Sale" signs than existed in Willingboro could be found in any other
jurisdiction. 124 To demonstrate a strong governmental interest in a
sign ban in a jurisdiction in which panic selling is extant, the
government would still be required to prove that its sign ban
diminishes panic selling. 125
The district court and court of appeals in Barrick did not apply
these principles. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its
decision before the Supreme Court decided Bigelow and Virginia
Pharmacy.126 The court of appeals in Barrick analyzed the facts of
that case, therefore, without the benefit of the Supreme Court's
holding that there is a right to disseminate and receive truthful
commercial information. 127 Whereas the court of appeals in Barrick
believed the "inconvenience of having to utilize alternative methods
of advertising and information gathering" to be "minor,"128 the
Linmark Court was convinced that the alternative means of
disseminating this type of information were insufficient. 129 The
Linmark Court demanded that Willingboro show an actual diminution of panic selling in consequence of its sign ban. l30 The court of
appeals in Barrick, however, was satisfied that a diminution of
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 164.
Id. at 164-65.
See id. at 163-64.
See 97 S. Ct. 1614, 1619-20 (1977).
535 F.2d 786, 799 (3rd Cir. 1976).
See 97 S. Ct. at 1620.
See id. at 1618.
See id. at 1619-20.
The Seventh Circuit decided Barrick in 1974 while Bigelow and Virginia
Pharmacy were handed down in 1975 and 1976 respectively.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
491 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir. 1974).
97 S. Ct. at 1618.
See id. at 1619-20.
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panic selling was a conceivable consequence of Gary's sign ban. 131
In short, had the Supreme Court also decided Barrick, it probably
would have struck down Gary's ordinance for the same reasons it
struck down Willingboro's ordinance. The Barrick situation would
not have deterred the application of the principles that people have
the right to disseminate and receive truthful commercial information, that they have the option to act irrationally upon that
information, and that "the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence."132
If a jurisdiction can prove both that it is suffering from panic
selling and that its sign ban actually diminishes that panic selling
substantially, then it is uncertain whether the sign ban is consistent
with the first amendment's guarantee of some commercial speech
protection. The Supreme Court has never faced a situation of this
type. On the one hand, a sign ban's actual diminution of real panic
selling strengthens the governmental interest in the sign ban, and a
much closer case than was presented in Linmark is present. On the
other hand, the first amendment interest in "For Sale" signs is a
weighty one. The only possible clue provided by the Linmark Court
was that Court's use of the words of former Justice Brandeis from a
political speech case:
"If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence. Only an emergency can justify repression."133
It is arguable, therefore, that in the absence of an "emergency"
which threatens the very existence of a community, panic selling is a
prima facie insufficient justification for a ban on "For Sale" signs.

VII. MARYLAND LAW
The Baltimore City Council, the Baltimore County Council, and
the Maryland General Assembly have enacted legislation which
either bans or provides for the ban of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs in
their respective jurisdictions. To date there has been no judicial
determination of whether these Maryland laws will survive the
Linmark decision.
Baltimore City Ordinance No. 701 impliedly prohibits the
display of "For Sale" signs outside of single-family residences. 134
131. See 491 F.2d at 163-65.
132. 97 S. Ct. at 1620 (citing Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring».
133. Id.
134. BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 30, § 10.0-22-(b)(1) as amended by Ordinance
701 (July 19, 1974). Article 30 (1966) was superseded by Ordinance 1051 (April 20,
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Because of the Linmark decision, the constitutionality of this
ordinance is a hotly debated issue among many interested parties.
Potential challenges to the constitutionality of the city ordinance are
emerging in three forms: (1) violations of the ordinance, earmarked
as "test cases;" (2) a declaratory judgment action; and (3) legislation.
A group of black realtors has attempted to test the ordinance by
posting approximately 100 "For Sale" signs in residential communities in Baltimore. 135 The Greater Baltimore Board of Realtors decided
to confront the issue directly, and announced its intention to file a
petition in the Baltimore City Circuit Court for a declaratory
decree. 13s On the political front, a city council person introduced a bill
before the city council to repeal the city's sign prohibition. 137 The
councilperson stated that "[t]he city has ignored the constitutional
mandate of the highest court in the land. Because of the Supreme
Court's decision in the [Linmark] case, it's incumbent upon
Baltimore to void the ordinance."138 Although it is not certain which
forum will first force the issue, or when that will happen, it seems
likely that a determination of the constitutionality of Baltimore
City's sign ban ordinance is in the offing.
The Linmark decision has not persuaded all involved that the
city's ordinance must fall. The city solicitor's office has stated that it
will continue to enforce the "For Sale" sign prohibition, as the office
considers the ordinance dissimilar to the Willingboro ordinance. 139
Although the solicitor's office has yet to couch its contention in more

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

1971), a comprehensive zoning ordinance. Ordinance 701 amends this 1971
ordinance. It states, in pertinent part:
b. The following types of signs, subject to the limitations prescribed
for them, shall be permitted for uses authorized as principal or
conditional uses in Residence and Office-Residence Districts:
1. One non-illuminated sale or lease sign for [each street frontage of
the lot, not exceeding a height of five feet, and having an area not
exceeding six square feet. For] multiple family dwellings, apartment
hotels, and non-residential buildings. Such [such] sign shall not exceed a
height of eight feet if free standing, and shall not extend above the roof
line if attached to a building and shall not exceed an area of 36 square
feet.
The bracketed material indicates matter stricken from Ordinance 1051 while the
italicized material indicates matter added to Ordinance 1051. By deft draftmanship, Ordinance 701 therefore excised language permitting "For Sale" signs in
front of single family homes, thereby impliedly prohibiting such signs. Violation
of the 1974 ordinance is a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of between $25
and $100. § 11.0-7.
The Sunday Sun, July 24, 1977, at F1, col. 1.
Id. As of mid-November, 1977, however, the Board had not yet filed such a
petition.
City Council of Baltimore Bill No. 1031 (introduced June 27, 1977 by City
Council person Michael B. Mitchell).
The Sun, June 24, 1977, at D18, col. 6.
The Sunday Sun, July 24, 1977, at F1, col. 1. Despite the publicity given the black
realtors' posting of "For Sale" signs, the solicitor's office innocently reported
that no violations have been referred to it for prosecution. The city zoning
administrator, the person responsible for reporting the violations, stated that his
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definitive terms, a community organization president has specifically asserted why he considers the two ordinances distinguishable. l4O He argued that, unlike the single-purpose Willingboro
ordinance, which prohibited only "For Sale" and "Sold" signs, the
implied ban in Baltimore City is part of a larger ban on "all" signs
in residential neighborhoods.1 41 It is, however, a fundamental
principle that a statute may be constitutional in one part while
unconstitutional in another.142 If the invalid part is severable from
the rest, the portion that is constitutional can stand, while that part
that is unconstitutional can be stricken and rejected. 143 The aesthetic
objectives behind the Baltimore City ordinance may support bans on
other types of signs. 144 The ban on "For Sale" signs, however, is
clearly severable and must be supported by a strong governmental
interest in order to outweigh - or possess a chance of outweighing
- the important first amendment concerns at stake. The city's
interest in its sign ban would seem to be weakened by the fact that
its ordinance contains thirteen express exceptions to the prohibition
of "all" signs. 145
The only manner in which the Baltimore ban on "For Sale"
signs can possibly pass constitutional scrutiny is by a showing of en
masse panic selling that creates an "emergency" situation. In
addition, the city would have to prove that its sign ban diminishes
such panic selling. It is doubtful, however, that sufficient evidence of
an emergency situation could be adduced in Baltimore. Should the
issue ripen into a judicial dispute, the Maryland courts will probably
find that panic selling in Baltimore is not of a magnitude sufficient
for the state interest to overshadow the first amendment interest in
the free flow of truthful information about available for-sale homes.
In 1972, the Baltimore County Council enacted an ordinance
prohibiting persons from displaying "For Sale" or "Sold" signs in

140.

141.
142.
143.

144.

145.

inspectors have not yet received any complaints, and will not issue citations
unless someone calls and objects. The city is obviously avoiding a confrontation
while it reexamines the continued validity of its ordinance in light of Linmark.
Pretl, Should "For Sale" Signs Be Banned Here? The Sun, June 25, 1977, at A14,
col. 3.
Id.
Chaplin sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Baltimore v. O'Conor, 147
Md. 639, 128 A. 759 (1925).
Id. Article 30, § 2.0-3 of the Baltimore City Code (as amended by Ordinance 1051)
provides that in case of judicial determination of the unconstitutionality of a
portion of the statute, the Mayor and City Council declare that they would have
supported the remaining provisions of the statute. But see Anne Arundel County
v. Moushabek, 269 Md. 419, 428, 306 A.2d 517, 522 (1973).
While aesthetic considerations may play a role in the zoning process, an
ordinance based on aesthetics alone, which does not enhance the public welfare,
is invalid as an impermissible use of police powers. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 299 A.2d 828 (1973). See generally 3
U. BALT. L. REV. 125 (1973).
BALTIMORE CITY, MD. CODE art. 30, § 1O.0-1(f)(1-5), -2(b)(1-8).
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any area designated by the Council as "prohibited." 146 In an
unreported per curiam opinion 147 handed down twenty-five days
after Linmark was decided, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
avoided first amendment questions by upholding a lower court
decision which invalidated the ordinance on procedural grounds. 148
Section 230C of Article 56 149 grants the Maryland Real Estate
Commission the authority to suspend the use of "For Sale" and
"Sold" signs by real estate licensees in areas determined by the
commission to be "Real Estate Conservation Areas." Such a ban can
only be imposed after a finding that either:
(1) the racial or economic stability of a neighborhood is
threatened by the volume of real estate transactions, or
(2) an abnormal real estate market with depressed values is
developing in a neighborhood because of excessive sales offerings, or
(3) certain methods of advertising or solicitation could be
damaging to the public or to the dignity and integrity of the real
estate profession. l50
Although the constitutionality of this statute has never been tested
in the Maryland courts, it is vulnerable to attack under the first and
fourteenth amendments.
A Georgia statute, similar to § 230C was held to be violative of
the due process and equal protection ctauses of the fourteenth
amendment in DeKalb Real Estate Bd. v. Chairman of Bd. of
Comm'rs. i51 The DeKalb court found that, as the statute applied only
to real estate brokers and not to homeowners, it unconstitutionally
"put persons into classes based upon criteria unrelated to the
purpose of the legislation."152 Should the Maryland courts find
DeKalb unpersuasive, it will still be necessary to justify the state's
interest in the statute in light of Linmark's mandatory authority.
Whether the real estate sign ban ordinances now in effect in
Maryland, or any other jurisdiction, can pass constitutional muster
turns solely on how narrowly the Linmark decision is read. In view
of the lack of striking differences between the Maryland and
Linmark settings, the Maryland ordinances will likely be found
unconstitutional.
VIII.

OTHER IMPLICATIONS

The ramifications of the Linmark decision extend well beyond
the Court's disaffirmance of "For Sale" sign proscriptions. The
146. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD. CODE, § 14-24 to -29 (Cum Supp. 1975).
147. Baltimore County, Md. v. Wallich, No. 644 (Ct. Spec. App. May 27, 1977).
148. [d. The court found that Baltimore County failed to take the requisite procedural
steps for enacting a zoning ordinance.
149. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230C (Supp. 1977).
150. [d.
151. 372 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
152. [d. at 754.
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marked death of the commercial speech exception coupled with the
enhanced constitutional value in the free flow of commercial
information raise other questions.
One fertile topic of interest also concerns the dissemination of
speech involving real estate transactions. Section 3604(e) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 153 proscribes certain speech for the purpose of
preventing "blockbusting." In a typical blockbusting situation, a
realtor persuades an individual to sell his property because,
allegedly, minorities are "moving in" and property values are
declining as a result. Consequently, the homeowner sells to the
realtor at a deflated price, and the realtor then sells to a minority
group member at an inflated price.
Several realtors prosecuted for "blockbusting" under § 3604(e)
have attempted to assert a constitutional right to disseminate
truthful information about the changing racial characteristics of a
neighborhood. 154 Whether a lone congressional policy of promoting
racial integration, without the benefit of the now laid-to-rest
commercial speech exception, will sustain a court ruling under
§ 3604(e) is now in doubt. This is particularly true since the statute is
not a time, place or manner restriction, but is a proscription on
content in that it proscribes realtors from dispensing information
about particular subjects, whether or not the information is truthful.
In support of the continued validity of § 3604(e) is the Pittsburgh
Press principle that when speech is part of unlawful conduct it is not
entitled to first amendment protection. 155 Since the Fair Housing Act
proscribes steering and blockbusting by realtors, speech related to
such unlawful conduct may be unprotected also.
Another question impliedly raised by Linmark and other postVirginia Pharmacy cases is whether the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 196~, 156 which prohibits cigarette advertising on
television and radio, remains constitutionally sound. In Capitol
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,15 7 the Supreme Court affirmed without
opinion a district court's holding that the federal government has
the power to regulate advertising on the broadcasting media. 158 The
district court relied, in part, on the now extinct commercial speech
exception to the first amendment. The court reiterated the Chrestensen principle that "product advertising is less vigorously
153. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (Supp. V 1975).
154. E.g., U.S. v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 826 (1973). The constitutionality of Maryland's antiblockbusting statute,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230A (Cum. Supp. 1977), has similarly withstood a first
amendment challenge in State v. Wagner, 15 Md. App. 413, 291 A.2d 161 (1972).
155. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973).
156. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1970).
157. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aiI'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting
Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
158. 333 F. Supp. at 584.
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protected than other forms of speech."159 Should the Act face a
constitutional challenge, it is possible that the Court will recognize
an insurmountable right of the American public to receive information about the availability and individual merits of cigarettes, even
if the reception of such advertisements would cause Americans to
make the irrational decision to smoke. On the other hand, the Court
might yield to the strong state interest in public health and find the
personal decision of whether or not to smoke to be a first amendment
interest of a lesser magnitude than those in Virginia Pharmacy or
Linmark.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Linmark is one of the rippling effects of Virginia Pharmacy in
the real estate and fair housing areas. The principles of Virginia
Pharmacy, as solidified in Linmark, will have a far-reaching impact
on the commercial world. Having created a new constitutional
interest in the free flow of truthful and legitimate commercial
information, the Court has rapidly expanded its coverage in a caseby-case analysis. It has already placed a dent in the once
impenetrable edifice of legal advertising bans l60 and has even
reached into such areas as the sale of contraceptives to minors.161
Questions remain, however, as to the strength of the governmental
interest necessary to restrict different kinds of commercial speech
under particular circumstances.
Russell C. Minkoff
John Bennett Sinclair

ADDENDUM
Since the initial printing of this Comment, there have been two
significant developments in Maryland with respect to "For Sale"
sign prohibitions. Ordinance No. 701 has been undergoing judicial
scrutiny in Baltimore City, while a new sign ban of dubious
constitutional validity has been adopted in Baltimore County.
As mentioned in the Comment, a group of black realtors, with
the intent to challenge the city ordinance, posted "For Sale" signs on
various properties in Baltimore. Their challenge was accepted by the
city. On December 13, 1977, the city filed a bill of complaint seeking
a permanent injunction in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City
against James Crockett, a black realtor from West Baltimore.

159. Id.
160. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
161. See Carey v. Population Services International, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977).
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The sign which triggered the action was posted in front of a row
house in the 1900 block of McCulloh Street in Baltimore. As this area
has had a predominantly black population for many years, the city
will be hard pressed to establish en masse panic selling of the type
necessary to possibly avoid the application of the Linmark ruling in
court. The ordinance will probably be overturned because its
application to a predominantly black area is overbroad and because
of the Linmark rule.
On January 3, 1978, the Baltimore County Council voted five-to~
two to accept Bill No. 172-77, as amended, which imposes a thirtyday limit on the display of "For Sale" signs in designated
"prohibited display areas." In so doing, the council remedied the
procedural defects that invalidated its 1972 sign ban. The bill was
not signed by County Executive Theodore Venetoulis, but became
law, nevertheless.
As orginally conceived by Councilperson Gary Huddles (D., 2d),
the sign ban bill would have permitted the council to prohibit real
estate sales signs in a designated area for up to two years at a time if
fifteen percent of the property owners (at least ten persons required)
petitioned the council. If the council received a petition, held a public
hearing, and determined that "the sales displays could be damaging
to the health and/or general welfare of the public within all or any
portion of the area under petition," then the council would be
permitted to impose a "For Sale" sign prohibition.
The sting of Bill No. 172-77 was markedly soothed - but only
temporarily - by an amendment by Councilperson Clarence E.
Ritter (R., 3d), which was passed four-to-three. The Ritter Amendment provided that even if an area obtained a sign prohibition
designation from the county council, signs could still be placed on
properties in the area for "a period not longer than thirty days after
the date of the real estate listing." Councilperson John V. Murphy
(D., 1st), a supporter of the original Huddles version of the bill,
stated that the council had "taken the heart out of the bill . . .
because the thirty-day period is when the damage is done." After
expressing their dismay at the passage of the Ritter Amendment,
Councilperson Huddles and his supporters nevertheless voted for the
amended bill, recognizing political realities and wanting some form
of sign ban. On February 7, 1978, however, a final amendment
striking the thirty-day grace period was passed; presently, then, the
enactment conforms to the original Huddles proposal.
The Baltimore County sign ban bill is probably in violation of
the United States Constitution. That an "emergency" situation
might be an exception to Linmark will be of no aid to supporters of
the bill, for sign bans can be imposed under the bill in situations far
less serious than emergencies.

